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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

I>.i\l{ltEI_JIJ J. DONOHUE,
·~
Plaintiff-A ppcllfl!tl,

I
~

i

vs.

Case No.
10079

Defendant-Respondent. .

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

srrA'fE~lEN'f

OF KIND OF CASE

'rhis is an action by plaintiff to recover for the
wrongful death of his minor son resulting from a collision bet,veen an automobile being driven by defendant
and a bicycle ridden by decedent.

DISPOSITIOX IN LO,VER COURT
1.,he case "·as tried to a jury, and from a verdict
and a judgment for defendant the plaintiff appeals.
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON .t\.PPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and an
order granting plaintiff a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages
for the death of his son resulting from the defendant
running over the decedent, who at the time was riding
his bicycle. From a judgment on a verdict in favor
of defendant, No Cause of Action, plaintiff appeals.
At approximately 11:45 A.M. on June 6, 1962,
defendant was driving south in the west lane of traffic
on Carbon County road No. 6441, in the City of Spring
Glen, Carbon County, Utah. (R. 151). The road at
the point where the accident happened is a blacktop
straight road, with two unmarked lanes for north and
southbound traffic. The paved portion of the highway
is 21 feet wide with a 4-foot shoulder on the east and
a 19-foot shoulder on the west. The road has a slight
grade to the south. 'fhe area is residential with homes
located on the west side of the road. (R. 134, 135}.
The defendant was alone in her car and was driving
to Price, Utah, to report to work. She had traveled a
distance of approximately % of a mile when she sa·w
three small children moving in a southerly direction
along the west shoulder of the road. (R. 152, 153.)
She estimated the children were approximately 2 feet
off the paved portion of the road and noticed the first
4
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t•hild. a srnall girl. \Vas "·alking and the other t\\·o children \\·ere riding bieyeles. "'\ccording to her testimony,
upon seeing these children she reduced her speed from
:!0 tniles per hour to 1.3 Iniles per hour. (l{. 15~-155.)
I )efendant testified she passed the first t\\·o children

without difficulty. After she had passed the second
child. she noticed the third child was still riding his
hil·yele on the gravel shoulder adjacent to the road.
(It };)H.) Defendant testified she then heard a ''clang."
She stepped on the brakes and turned to the left. After
stopping the automobile she turned and saw the deceased and his bicycle lying in the road. (R. 159, 160.)
Defendant admitted she did not see the deceased
in front of her ear prior to the point of impact. (R.
I.>H.) She further admitted she failed to honk her horn
at any time prior to the collision. (R. 156.)
The n1inor son of plaintiff died within a few hours
after the accident. (R. 175.) He was six and one-half
years old. ( R. 173.)
The investigating officer testified that when he
arrived at the scene he found a bicycle lying in the west
lane of traffic "·ith its front '"heel near the center of
the road and pointing in an easterly direction. There
\Vere approximately 6 feet 7 inches of gouge marks on
the road to the north of the bicycle, the bicycle was 3
feet south of the gouge n1arks. and 23 feet south of
the bicycle and near the center of the road was a spot
of blood. The officer estimated the point of impact
5
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was 6 feet north of the gouge marks and the automobile stopped 16 feet beyond the blood spot, having
traveled a total distance of 54 feet after the impact. (R.
136-138.) There were no skid marks. (R. 151.) (See
Exhibit 1.)
The investigating officer examined the vehicle belonging to the defendant and found a dent on the
right hood and fragments of hair on the right headlight. This damage was caused when the car struck
the child. (R. 145.)
The jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. (R. 75a.)
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 76) which
was denied by the court. (R. 80}. It is the judgment
of No Cause of Action which is the subject of this
appeal.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.7.
Instruction No. 7 (R. 54) charges the jury as follows:
"The deceased, Phillip Donohue, had a duty
to use that degree of care which a reasona~ly
prudent child of his age, understanding and Intelligence as you find it would use:
6
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"1.

'ro select a course of tra Yel

d~.

'ro observe and become a\vare of the pres-

for his bicycle
reasonably free of the hazard of getting into the
eourse of a tnoving automobile on the highway;
ence and moYement of the Defendant's car upon
the high"·ay and avoid colliding with the same.
'"If you find by a fair preponderance of the
e\·idence that the deceased violated his duty in
one or more of the particulars above mentioned
aiHI that his doing so \vas the sole proximate cause
of his being struck by the Defendant's automobile, or one of the contributing proximate causes
of his being so struck, then you must find a verdict in favor of the Defendant and against the
Plaintiff, no cause of action."
Plaintiff objects to the whole of said instructio11
and to Yarious portions thereof, and respectfully subtnits the giving of the instruction was reversible error.
\Y. e contend the instruction is error because the court
determined as a matter of law the standard of care
required by this deceased child. We submit that in cases
involYing the question of whether or not the conduct
of a child constitutes contributory negligence, the
standard of care 'vith which the child should be charged
is a n1atter to be submitted to the jury. In support of
this contention "·e refer the court to the following
authorities:

In Jlorby ·c. Rogers~ 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231,
the defendant attempted to have a child of 13 years
declared to be contributorily negligent as a matter
of la'v for violating a provision of the Motor ehicle

'T
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Code. In refusing to so hold, this Court stated at pages
233 and 235, 252 P.2d:
"The problem thus presented to us is whether
the generally accepted rule as to consideration
of an infant's age and capacity in determining
the question of his negligence is to prevail over
the rule establishing negligence as a matter of
law upon violation of a statutory duty promulgated for his safety. We believe that it should.

*

*

*

"The fact that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction that a law violation is negligence as a
matter of law, does not overcome the rule that the
contributory negligence of a child is to be determined according to the proper standard of care
with which he is charged, does not mean that the
statutory violation rule is nullified where children
are involved. If the violation of a statute by a
child is found to evidence less care than that which
ordinarily could be expected of a child of the same
age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience, he
could be held contributorily negligent barring his
recovery. On an issue of contributory negligence,
this measuring and judging the accountability
of children of immature age is ordinarily to be
left to a jury as a question of fact about which
there might be reasonable difference of opinion.
The trial court did not err in so ruling."
In Mann v. Fairbourn~ 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d
603, plaintiff attempted to have the court rule that a
child of 51h years was incapable of being charged with
contributory negligence. With respect to this question,
the Court stated as follows at page 606:

8
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··'rhe capacity or incapacity of a child is a
factual inquiry and the test to be applied is that
applicable to any other question of fact. If the
trial judg·e. after a consideration of age, experience and ca pac1 ty of the child to understand and
avoid the risks and dangers to which it "·as exp< lse< I in the actual circumstances and situation
of the case, deter1nines that fair-1ninded men
n1ight honestly differ as to \vhether the child
failed to exercise that degree of care that is usually exercised hy persons of similar age, experience
and intelligence, the question of the child's contributory negligence should be submitted to the
jury. but if the trial judge determines that fairBlinded men could not conclude that the child
had the capacity to be negligent, then he should
decide the question of incapacity."
In He rald v. Smith_, 56 Utah 304, 190 P. 932,
the trial court directed a verdict against a 4-year-10-nlonth-old child on the ground the child 'vas contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In reversing this
decision the l~ourt stated as follows at pages 933 and
~);3~:

"The plaintiff 'vas a little girl four years and
ten Inonths old. She was lawfully on the street
at the time of the accident. The defendant's duty
to the plaintiff cannot be measured by what he
n1ight reasonably haYe expected to be the conduct of an adult person in such circumstances.
It "~as his duty to avoid the accident if possible
in the exercise of ordinary care, and it "·as for
the jury to say "'"hether he .,"·as justified in assuming that the plaintiff would do or might do the
acts 'vhich the testimony shows she actually did .
. .-\ child of that age cannot, as a matter of la,v,

9
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be held to have appreciated the danger and is
not presumed to conduct herself as an adult
person would under similar circumstances. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the plaintiff had sufficient capacity to understand or appreciate the danger to which she was exposed by
the approach of the defendant's automobile. In
fact, the contrary appears.
" 'The degree of care required of a child
must be graduated to its age, capacity, and experience, and must be measured by what might
ordinarily be expected from a child of like age,
capacity, and experience under similar conditions. If it acted as might reasonably be expected of such a child, it cannot be charged with
contributory negligence.' Gesas v. O.S.L.R.R.,
33 Utah 156, 93 P. 279, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1074."
The case of Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co.J
90 Utah 578, 63 P.2d 267, involved the death of a
child as the result of being struck by a car. From a
judgment for plaintiff the defendant appealed. The
case was reversed for an error concerning the court's
instruction of the duty of the defendant driver, but the
Court did comment on the instruction given concerning
the duty of the deceased child. In this case the court
instructed the jury as follows:
"You are instructed that in determining
whether the infant, Charles Franklin 'Voodward,
was guilty of contributory negligence, you are
to consider whether he was exercising that degree of care and caution which a reasonably prudent person of his age, general development, and

10
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nutturity should exercise under like circums tnnces. It is the d u tv of children to exercise that
degree of care to a,:oid injuries, which children
of the satne age are accustomed to exercise under
like eircun1stances and the maturity and capacity
of the infant, his ability to understand and appreciate the danger, and his familiarity with the
surroundings in the particular case, are all matters to be taken into consideration in determining
this question.
'l'he Court stated:
~' \ \r e

find no error in giving of that instruction.
One of the defenses interposed by the defendants
"·as that the child, Charles Franklin Woodward,
"·as negligent and that his negligence contributed to the injury which resulted in his death. It
\vas proper that the jury should be instructed as
to the nature and degree of care that the law
imposed upon him." (Citing cases.)
In the case of Kawaguchi v. Bennett_, 112 Utah
-t4:?. 189 P.2d 109, the court was considering the ques·
tion of 'vhether an 8-year-old child could be held contributorily negligent. The Court reviewed and approved
the trial court's instruction. That instruction is as follows:

''The degree of care required of a child must
be graduated to its age, capacity and experience,
and must be measured by what might ordinarily
be expected of a child of like age and capacity
under similar conditions, and, if it acted as might
reasonably be expected of such a child, it cannot
be charged with contributory negligence.
~'This

instruction is in accord with our view
expressed in Herald v. Smith, supra."
11
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See also 174 A.L.R. 1084 and 1170; 77 .~1.L.R.
2d 917.

Instruction No. 7 imposes on a six-year-old child
a duty to exercise care first to select a course reasonably
free of hazards; second to observe and become aware
of defendant's car; and third to avoid colliding with
defendant's car. '1 he basic fault with the instruction
is that whether a six-year-old child in the exercise of
ordinary care, under the facts of this case, would haYe
observed or become aware of the car and taken any
measures to avoid same are fact questions. The instruction imposes these duties as a matter of law. To paraphrase the situation, in order to clarify the point, the
trial court says the child must exercise the care of a
child of his intelligence and age. But in the exercise
of that care, he has a legal duty "to observe and become
a'vare of ... defendant's car." What is more, the child
had the additional duty to "avoid colliding with same."
If the child had the legal duty of observing and avoiding the car, plaintiff could not prevail because obviously
the child did not a void the car. This instruction erroneously comments on the evidence, places the legal
duty on the child of avoiding the car, and this is tantamount to a directed verdict. The trial court might just
as well have instructed the jury that the child was contributorily negligent and that plaintiff should not be
allowed to recover. As the authorities cited clearly indicate, the only duty the child had was to comport himself
in the 1nanner of a reasonably prudent six-year-old1

12
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not to hu ve the eye of an eagle and the agility of an
acrobat, as the instruction \vould seem to itnply.
'l'he trial court in this case attempted to impose
upon the decedent a standard of care that was too
onerous even for an adult. Decedent was only six years
of age and in many states it would be conclusively
prcstnned that he was incapable of being guilty of
contributory negligence. ( 17 4 A.L.R. at 1125).

'fhe error in Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial and
reversible.
Language similar to that in the case at bar has
been held by this Court to constitute reversible error.
In Saltas v. Affleck) 99 Utah 281, 105 P.2d 176,
this court co~sidered a similar instruction which provided as follows :
"In this case it was the duty of the defendant
Kenneth Butte to drive his automobile on said
highway, using reasonable care and prudence
so that he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any person on the highway.))
In ruling on the instruction this Court declared:
"The instruction if followed practically instructed the jury that the defendant in addition
to keeping a proper lookout and requiring the
exercise of ordinary care and prudence having
in consideration due vigilance commensurate
\vith the circumstances and surroundings required him to use such care and prudence so that
he could avoid colliding with anyone, regardless
of "·hether such one were or were not guilty of
negligence.

13
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''That part of the instruction failed to take
into consideration the right of defendant to assume that all other persons upon the high,vay
would use ordinary care and reasonable precaution for their own safety until the contrary appeared.''
We also call attention to the fact that defendant's
automobile overtook and struck the child from the rear.
Instruction No. 7 imposes on the child the duty not
only to observe defendant's automobile but to observe
it as it approached from the rear. It is difficult to conceive how much more onerous to plaintiff's case this
instruction could become.
This Court has on at least two occasions held that
there is no legal duty of a traveler on the highway to
keep himself apprised of traffic coming up on him from
the rear-let alone imposing such a duty on a six-yearold child.
See Covington~ etc.~ v. Carpenter~ 4 Utah 2d 378,
294 P.2d 788; Hayden v. Cederlund~ I Utah 2d 171,
263 p .2d 796.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Instruction No.
7 requires a reversal of this case.

POINT II
'l_,HE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED RE\TERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO IX-
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S'l'ltlJlHL' TIIJ~ JUlt\r ON TilE 1"HEOR\?"
L.\S'l' l LEAlt CH..:\NCE.

0~,

1

rhe tria} l'OUft refused plaintiff's request to haYe
the jury instructed on the theory of last clear chance.
l n revie,ving this ruling, the Court must now construe
the evidence in the light 1nost favorable to the plaintiff.
It '"ill be recalled that the defendant was the only
witness "·ho testified as to the happening of this accident.
She testified that as she proceeded in a southerly direction along the highway she first saw the deceased and
two other children riding their bicycles along the
shoulder of the highway; that the deceased was ahead
of the other children. Defendant did not testify as to
the exact distance in feet she was from the children
'rhen she first saw them, but did describe the distance
us being "from "·ay up on that corner." (R. 154.) Defendant further testified she reduced her speed from
20 n1iles per hour to 15 miles per hour and guided her
car closer to the center of the road. Defendant admitted
the deceased 'vas within her vision at all times, but she
did not once honk the horn of her car and warn the
deceased of her approach. She did not claim by her testimony that deceased was aware of her position on
road prior to the collision. We contend the reasonable
inference to be drawn from her entire testimony is that
the deceased was evidently inattentive and unaware of
her autotnobile and the impending danger.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that under these
circtunstances a JUry question was presented as to
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whether or not the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid this accident. In support of this contention we
refer the court to the following citation:
In the case of Morby v. Rogers_, supra, the defendant sounded his horn approximately 200 feet from the
bicycle rider but waited until he was within 20 feet before sounding it again. In affirming submission of the
doctrine to the jury, the trial court stated as follows, at
page 236:
"Thus the matter was properly submitted to
the jury, if the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would reasonably support a finding (a) that the defendant knew of
the plaintiff's situation of danger, and (b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff
was inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril
in time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant
thereafter was negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."

*

*

*

"Sounding his horn: the defendant's own testimony reveals that he was a "~are that the deceased seemed to be oblivious to his approach.
He did sound his horn at 200 feet but waited
until within about 20 feet of the boy before
sounding it again. Should we exclude the other
safety factors above mentioned it seems that the
jury could reasonably have found that a further
\varning by the horn between those two distances
1nay have enabled deceased to learn of defendant. 's approach and avoid the collision."

16
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In (;raluun ·c. ,/ohnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P.2d
~au, the trial court had directed a verdict in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff minor child. In that
case the defendant \vas driving her vehicle along a city
street and s~nv the plaintiff minor child playing in the
street. She did not sound her horn or stop her car prior
to in1 pact. A friend of plaintiff shouted and warned
him of the approach of the vehicle. In reversing the
ruling of the trial court, this Court ruled as follows:
"\\rhat we have really been considering is a
rather unique application of the so-called last
clear chance doctrine. Our discussion has dealt
'vith a negligent omission of Darlene in not
timely sounding her horn-an omission actuated
by a worthy m~tive but which the jury could
nevertheless find to be negligence. It has also
been conceded that the boys were negligent in
that they were in violation of the ordinance
against playing in the street which ordinance was
designed for their protection as well as for the
expedition of traffic. Why then in this case does
not the negligence of plaintiff bar recovery even
though Darlene was negligent? The reason lies
in the fact that in this situation the so-called humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance applies."
This court then made reference to the Restatement
of 'forts on this subject and stated as follows:
"Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the
plaintiff "·as inattentive but had the ability, had
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to
"·hich the defendant 'vas subjecting him. But
in both cases the liability of the defendant arose
because he failed to take the opportunity "vhich
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he alone had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in
getting himself in a position where he 'vas helpless or because he was so inattentive that he was
not alert to the approaching danger over "·hich
defendant had control. And in both cases to hold
the defendant liable it must plainly appear to
the jury that defendant knew or reasonably
should have known of plaintiff's helpless peril
or of his inattention and after such realization
or after he reasonably, had he been conducting
himself with the vigilance required of him, should
have known it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.'
In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's negligence has become in a sense fixed and realizable
and on to this state of things defendant approaches on to the negligent plaintiff vvith and
in control of the danger."
In concluding the opinion, this Court stated:
"In situations where reasonable minds must
all come to the conclusion that a defendant had
ample opportunity to utilize an existing ability
to a void harm to the plaintiff the court should
direct a verdict for the plaintiff; in situations
where reasonable minds must all conclude that
a defendant did not have such opportunity the
verdict should be directed for the defendant. In
those inter1nediate situations such as the supposition under the evidence that Darlene 'vas coming do,vn on the far west side of the street where
the court is in doubt as to whether all reasonable
1ninds could conclude one wav or the other he
should submit the case to the jury with instructions that it should be clearly convinced that the
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defendant had a clear chance, viz., ample opportunity or clearly an existing ability at the time
she reasonably should have appreciated the plaintiff's danger, to avoid harming him; otherwise
it should find for the defendant."
Defendant had ample opportunity to sound her
horn and "·arn the deceased of her approach. The jury
should haYe been per1nitted to determine whether or not
she failed to exercise her last clear chance to a void the
accident.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits the trial court comtnitted reversible error by the giving of Instruction
Xo. 7 and by refusing to instruct the jury on the theory
of last clear chance. In view of said errors, this Honorable Court should reverse and remand the case for a
ne\v trial.
Respectfully submitted,
R..L-\ ''rLINGS,

''rALLACE, ROBERTS

&

BLACK
S. V. LITIZETTE
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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